What Determines Leverage in Transition Countries? by Laurent Weill
234 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 5-6
KRÁTKÉ ČLÁNKY
UDC: 658.15; 339.137
Keywords: financial leverage – transition economies – manufacturing




This note investigates the determinants of leverage in the transition eco-
nomies from Central and Eastern Europe in 1998. Two major features cha-
racterize the financial systems of these economies at that time. First, the fi-
nancial markets are underdeveloped (Anderson – Kegels, 1998), (Scholtens,
2000). As a result, even large companies in the transition economies have
restricted access to stock and bond issues for their financing needs. Second,
the availability of retained earnings is lower than in Western Europe, be-
cause of the diminished profitability related to a worse economic situation.
Consequently, companies are expected to ask more credit in these count-
ries. Access to credit is thus a very important issue for the development of
these economies.
We then analyze the behavior of creditors, since credit rationing has been
shown in these countries (Hersch – Kemme – Netter, 1997), (Bratkowski
–  Grosfeld – Rostowski, 1998). Our study focuses on a comparative per-
spective with Western countries to analyze whether the factors influencing
leverage are similar between both groups of countries. To tackle this issue,
we test the determinants of leverage that are generally adopted in studies
for Western economies, by proceeding to a cross-border analysis of six tran-
sition countries, with various degrees of economic and financial develop-
ment. Berglöf and Bolton (2002) indeed underlined the existence of two
groups of transition countries according to their degree of financial deve-
lopment. It seems therefore relevant to investigate whether the determi-
nants of leverage are similar in all transition countries. We use the Ama-
deus database that provides information about a large number of com-
panies. The possible differences between countries in the factors correla-
ted to leverage are then investigated. The remainder of the paper pro-
ceeds as follows. The next section discusses related literature in Western
and transition countries. Section 3 presents data and variables. Section 4
examines the results. We sum up with some concluding remarks in sec-
tion 5.
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This section provides a brief survey of former empirical studies that have
been conducted on the determinants of leverage in Western and transition
countries. Table 1 displays the results of the main works in Western count-
ries. Leverage is defined in most studies as the ratio of the total balance
sheet minus equity divided by the total balance sheet. With more disag-
gregated data, Johnson (1997) looks at the determinants of the banking
debt ratio and the non-banking debt ratio. We can observe the focus using
four variables: profitability, tangibility of assets, growth, and size. Furt-
hermore, this survey gives us some insight to the expected relationship of
variables with leverage. (a) There exists a positive relationship with tangi-
bility of assets, which is confirmed by all the studies. (b) The relationship
with size is ambiguous, since it is either positively or negatively significant
depending on work. (c) Profitability tends to have a negative relationship.
(d) The relationship with growth is rather positive.
In addition to empirical evidence in Western countries, there exists scarce
evidence on the determinants of leverage for companies in transition count-
ries. The starting point of this literature is the importance of self-financing
these countries. The low level of bank credit is pointed out by Scholtens
(2000) among others: the ratio of bank claims in the private sector divided
by the GDP, which approximates the importance of bank credit, was on ave-
rage 87.8 % for a group of Western economies, but only 22.9 % for a group
of Central European economies in 1995. This shows the diminished impor-
tance of bank credit in transition countries.
This feature may be explained at least partly by the lack of access to ex-
ternal financing. Hersch, Kemme and Netter (1997) notably show that 
three quarters of the managers of a sample of small privately-owned Hun-
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Study Sample Resultsa
De Jong and Van 102 listed Dutch companies tangibility of assets (+), marginal tax rate (+),
Dijk (1998) for 1996 industry-specific risk (-)
*non-banking debt ratio: market-to-book value
847 American companies
ratio (+), tangibility of assets (-), leverageb (-)
Johnson (1997)
for 1989
* banking debt ratio : tangibility of assets (+),
leverage (+), age (-), size (-), market-to-book
value ratio (-)
Michaelas, 3500 small British growth (+), future growth opportunities (+),
Chittenden and companies for 1995 tangibility of assets (+), operating risk (+),
Poutziouris (1999) size (+), net debtors (+), profitability (-), age (-)
Rajan and
4500 listed companies from
tangibility of assets (+), size (+),
Zingales (1995)
all G7 countries during
market-to-book value ratio (-), profitability (-) the period 1987–1991
Schwiete and 230 German companies profitability (+), capital concentration (+),
Weigand (1997) during the period 1967–1994 growth (-), risk (-), size (-)
Weill (2001) 564 British and 644 French growth (+), tangibility of assets (+),
companies for 1996 and 1997 profitability (-), size (-)
TABLE 1 Empirical Studies on the Determinants of Leverage
Notes: a The ‘Results’ column describes the observed relationships with leverage.
b Leverage is defined in this document as the ratio of equity and long-term debt to the total balance
sheet.
s_234_242  25.5.2004  17:44  Stránka 235garian companies find it difficult to get long-term bank loans, even if they
accept to pay the current interest rates. This notably results in the absence
of a credit worthy reputation for most companies. It is as well the conse-
quence of the collateral requested by the banks as security for a loan that
may exceed the capacities of the borrower, as observed by Fan, Lee and
Schaffer (1996) in Russia.
Following evidence of restricted access to external finance, the analy-
sis of the determinants of leverage can mostly be considered as work on
the factors of access to external finance, after taking internal financing
into account. We briefly present the results of four studies about this is-
sue in transition countries. Cornelli, Portes and Schaffer (1996) proceed
to an analysis on a large number of Hungarian and Polish companies.
They observed that leverage is negatively linked to profitability and tan-
gibility of assets. Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997) investigated this issue
on a small sample of Polish listed companies for the early years of tran-
sition (1991–1994). They tested several financial and ownership factors
that may influence leverage, defined as the ratio of all debt to either, to-
tal assets, equity or capital. Their study concludes in favor of a positive
influence for size, foreign ownership, the share of retained earnings in
the total balance sheet, but negative for age, current profitability and tan-
gible assets. They also pointed out the absence of role for ownership con-
centration and tax.
Csermely and Vincze (1999) extend the analysis to a large sample of Hun-
garian large and medium sized companies. They focused on the factors in-
fluencing the bank debt ratio. They showed that profitability, size, the pre-
vious year’sbank debt ratio and foreign ownership play apositive role, while
there exists negative influence for asset tangibility and no link for quick ra-
tio. In a comparative analysis with two Western countries (France, and
the United Kingdom), Weill (2001) provides detailed evidence on the de-
terminants of bank leverage, defined as the ratio of bank debt to total as-
sets, in the Czech Republic and Poland. His main conclusion is that there
are few significant factors for transition countries with comparison to Wes-
tern countries: leverage is not significantly linked to profitability, innova-
tion ratio, size and age, while tangibility has only a positive link with le-
verage in the Czech Republic. Only growth is significantly positive for both
countries.
We have also to present the results of Hersch, Kemme and Netter (1997)
already mentioned above. Their analysis of the factors favoring access to
bank credit for small Hungarian companies provides interesting insights:
the characteristics of the owner play a greater role than those for the com-
pany. Indeed, the size and age of the company are not significant, while
the prior experience of the owner and its former Nomenklatura member-
ship make it easier to obtain financing from the banks. These results must
however be considered with care since they concern the very beginning of
the transition.
This brief survey has highlighted the existence of differences in the de-
terminants of leverage between Western and transition countries. The most
striking difference is the negative relationship with tangibility of assets in
transition countries. Furthermore, there are some variations in the sign of
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ries. Thus, it appears relevant to investigate the determinants of leverage
on a large sample of transition countries.
3. Data and Variables
The sample of data is made up of information collected from about
4 500 manufacturing companies from six transition countries: Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. We used a ba-
lanced sample. Thedata is unconsolidated balance sheet data for 1996, 1997
and 1998.1 As in Konings, Rizov and Vandenbussche (2003)’s study, they
were gathered from theAmadeus database edited by Bureau Van Dijk. This
database includes data for companies whose total assets or turnover excee-
ded 12 million USD, or the number of employees exceeds 100. We limited
the analysis to manufacturing companies in order to have a homogenous
sample, because of the discrepancies in financial structure between indu-
stries. To this end, we selected companies with CSO codes between 2 000
and 4 999. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Weill (2001), we used
the broadest definition of leverage by defining it as the ratio of total liabi-
lities to total assets.
The starting point of our analysis is evidence of a credit rationing in tran-
sition countries. As a result, after controlling the internal financing by in-
cluding profitability, we make interpretations of the tested determinants of
leverage in terms of access to credit. Our aim is the comparison with Wes-
tern countries. Therefore, we adopted the four main explanatory variables
employed in the studies on the determinants of leverage in these countries.
The first explanatory variable is Profitability, measured as the return on
total assets in 1998. Two opposing effects of profitability may be suggested
on leverage. First, a high profitability is considered as a positive signal for
creditors, since it reduces the bankruptcy risk. Thus, a positive relation-
ship may be expected. Secondly, since companies are credit-constrained in
transition countries, the most profitable companies may finance more in-
vestment with their equity and may then have a lower leverage. Following
the evidence of credit rationing in transition countries, we expect a nega-
tive relationship of profitability with leverage. The second explanatory va-
riable is Tangibility, measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets in
1998. We expect a positive coefficient for this variable, due to the role of
tangible assets as collateral value for creditors. Collateral value plays a ma-
jor role in access to credit in transition countries, as confirmed by Brat-
kowski, Grosfeld and Rostowski (1998) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland, and by Fan, Lee and Schaffer (1996) in Russia.
The third explanatory variable is Growth, defined as the mean growth ra-
tio of the total balance sheet between 1996 and 1998. We expect a positive
coefficient for this variable since high growth is generally considered as
a proxy signal of good financial health of a company and is then positively
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1 1996 and 1997 data are only adopted for the computation of total balance sheet growth, given
the lack of data for other variables.
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the logarithm of turnover. A logarithm is adopted to reduce the dispersion
between companies. We expect a positive coefficient for this variable: size
may be considered as a proxy of failure risk, since large firms are more di-
versified and have a lower frequency of failure than small companies. The-
refore, creditors should be more willing to lend money or to grant higher
delays of payment to large firms.
We also include in each regression industry dummy variables to control
the possible impact of an industry on the determinants of leverage. As our
sample only includes manufacturing companies, we choose to divide our
sample in three categories, following the international CSO industrial clas-
sification: thefirst category consists of companies with CSO codes from 2000
to 2999 meaning all companies involved in extraction of minerals and ores
than fuels, the manufacture of metal and minerals and products. The se-
cond category consists of companies with CSO codes numbered between
3000 and 3999, meaning all companies involved in metal goods, enginee-
ring and vehicle industries. Finally the third category consists of compa-
nies with CSO codes between 4000 and 4999, meaning all companies in-
volved in other manufacturing industries. We then use two industry dummy
variables: Ind1 if the firm belongs to the first category and Ind2 if the firm
belongs to the second category.
We adopted the Tukey box-plot, based on the use of interquartile range
in order to clean thedata from outliers. Companies with data out of therange
defined by the first and third quartiles that are greater or less than twice
the interquartile range were excluded for the following ratios: leverage, pro-
fitability, tangibility of assets, and growth. Table 2 displays by country,
the mean values of variables used in the regressions. It also shows the dis-
tribution of firms across the three industries. We observed large discre-
pancies between countries for all variables. Mean leverage ranges from
44.59 % for Bulgaria to 56.46 % in Romania, this means that companies
from transition countries are marked by higher levels of capitalization than
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Czech
Bulgaria Republic Hungary Latvia Poland Romania
N 1022 848 185 122 850 1469
Leverage 44.59 54.47 51.30 49.06 47.34 56.46
Profitability 1.42 0.91 7.16 2.66 4.71 7.50
Tangibility 57.96 43.85 39.59 41.57 44.61 47.79
Growth 328.89 102.96 121.05 119.34 195.62 159.41
Size 7.25 9.35 9.14 8.44 10.06 7.63
Ind11 4.29 15.92 15.14 10.66 16.94 14.84
Ind23 0.04 44.22 35.68 19.67 31.76 27.09
Ind35 5.67 39.86 49.18 69.67 51.30 58.07
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables
(Table displays the mean values for each variable by country.)
Notes:  All ratios are multiplied by 100, except for Size.
Profitability the return on assets in 1998, Tangibility the ratio of fixed assets divided by total assets in 1998,
Growth the average growth of total balance sheet between 1996 and 1998, Size the logarithm of turnover
in 1998.
Ind1 (for companies involved in the extraction of minerals, ores and fuels, manufacture of metals and mi-
neral products), Ind2 (metal goods, engineering and vehicle industries), and Ind3 (other manufacturing in-
dustries) are industry dummy variables. Distribution is presented here as a percentage of firms across
the three industries.
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that mean leverage ranges from 57 % to 72 % for companies from G7 count-
ries. This fact could be misinterpreted as the consequence of a better fi-
nancial situation with a lower indebtedness for companies from transition
countries. However, Bratkowski, Grosfeld and Rostowski (1998) showed
that the reason of the high capitalization ratio in transition economies is
the reluctance of banks to provide loans, in comparison with Western eco-
nomies. Therefore, the differences in leverage may result from discrepan-
cies in access to credit between countries. This would mean that Bulgarian
companies would be the most credit-rationed companies in our sample.
4. Results
Here, we have performed the following regression for each country.
Leverage [Firm i] =   +  1 Profitability +  2 Tangibility +  3 Growth
+  4 Size +  5 Ind1 +  6 Ind2 +  i
We choose not to pool all observations in one sample for the regression,
as we consider that regressions by country provide more straightforward
results. This choice that was also chosen by Rajan and Zingales (1995) in
their cross-country analysis of G7 countries, is allowed by the size of our
national samples. Table 3 exhibits the results by country. Based upon the in-
dividual t-statistics and the value of the adjusted R2 statistics, we conclude
that the fit of the equation is quite satisfactory for all countries. We used
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Bulgaria Republic Hungary Latvia Poland Romania
Intercept 0.885*** 0.328*** 0.438*** 0.648*** 0.369*** 0.896***
(0.050) (0.103) (0.129) (0.213) (0.087) (0.048)
Profitability -0.854*** -0.797*** -0.927*** -0.541*** -0.829*** -0.861***
(0.061) (0.145) (0.132) (0.199) (0.057) (0.051)
Tangibility -0.676*** -0.340*** -0.363*** -0.355** -0.371*** -0.748***
(0.034) (0.050) (0.085) (0.137) (0.041) (0.032)
Growth -0.054*** 0.219*** 0.252*** 0.184* 0.177*** 0.053***
(0.008) (0.078) (0.080) (0.090) (0.023) (0.014)
Size 0.022*** 0.016** -0.275E-3 -0.023 -0.162E-3 0.524E-3
(0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.020) (0.008) (0.005)
Ind1 -0.020 -0.037 -0.053 -0.095 -0.050** -0.072***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.044) (0.079) (0.019) (0.018)
Ind2 -0.061*** 0.007 0.037 -0.037 -0.038** -0.086***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.033) (0.063) (0.016) (0.014)
N 1022 848 185 122 850 1469
Adjusted R 2 0.4119 0.0893 0.2686 0.0938 0.2567 0.3417
Condition 18.07 30.48 22.94 22.84 34.84 20.84
Index
TABLE 3 Factors Correlated with Leverage
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
*, ** and *** are significant at the 10, 5 and 1percent level respectively.
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the model. The multicollinearity of the regressions appears rather satis-
factory.
A first glance of the results shows that the tested variables are very sig-
nificant in most countries. We also notice few differences between countries
for the sign and the significance of variables. Profitability is negatively cor-
related with leverage in all countries, confirming that profitable firms rely
more on equity. The coefficient for Tangibility is significantly negative for
all countries. This relationship appears surprising since the role of collate-
ral value is expected to be of the utmost importance in transition countries
where banks exert special care to secure loans. This argument could how-
ever not be relevant for transition countries, as it ignores two features of
these economies. First, the enforcement of the law in case of bankruptcy
and liquidation is less efficient in transition countries than in Western
countries. Banks may then be inclined to weight positively collateral value
but in a lesser degree than in Western countries. Secondly, as suggested by
Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997), lenders in transition countries are parti-
cularly risk-adverse and may then attach great importance to liquidity. As
a result, the share of current assets in total assets should be positively va-
lued, leading to a negative relationship between tangibility and leverage.
Growth is positively correlated with leverage for five of the six countries
as expected. This stems from the positive valuation of growth by creditors
in transition countries. The only exception is Bulgaria where we observe
a negative and significant coefficient for this variable. This specific rela-
tionship might result from very high average growth of the Bulgarian sam-
ple that may lead to the lack of valuation by creditors for this non-discri-
minating feature.
The coefficient for Size is not significant in all countries, if we except Bul-
garia and the Czech Republic where it is significantly positive.2 Therefore,
the positive relationship expected in transition countries obtains no sup-
port for four of the six countries. In these countries with a high frequency
of company failure in comparison to Western countries, this is a surprising
result as size can be considered as one of the best signals of the probability
of survival. The reason may be the counterbalance of this positive effect by
a negative influence of size, as cited by Hersch, Kemme and Netter (1997):
large firms demand larger loans and larger payables that are harder to ob-
tain. The positive and very significant coefficient in Bulgaria might then
result from a weakened negative effect of size, as the mean-sized Bulgarian
company is the lowest of our sample.
Our results are in concordance with former studies of transition count-
ries, whose results were stated above. For instance, the unexpected nega-
tive sign for the tangibility of assets was also observed by Cornelli, Portes
and Schaffer (1996). However, since some of these scarce works only focus
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2 It has to be emphasized that we also tested the existence of a non-linear relationship between
leverage and size, by computing the same regressions by country. The variable Size was then
replaced by four dummy variables for size classes. Dummy variables were not significant in
the four countries other than Bulgaria and the Czech Republic for the two highest size classes.
This then means no non-linear or linear relationship between leverage and size, other than
the observed linear link in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.
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pare their results with ours. Our conclusion notably differs from Weill
(2001)’s that points out the lack of significance of usual determinants of le-
verage in theCzech Republic and Poland, but this study investigated thede-
terminants of bank leverage. To explain this difference, further research
should then be carried out on thedifferent determinants that influence bank
credit and trade credit in transition countries.
5. Concluding Remarks
We analyzed the usual determinants of leverage in six transition count-
ries, to investigate if they play a similar role in Western countries. We ob-
served the significance of tested factors in most countries, with some diffe-
rences with thepattern of Western countries. Theleast profitable firms have
on average ahigher leverage, while higher growth favors leverage. Size does
not influence leverage in four countries, whereas there exists a striking ne-
gative relationship between the tangibility of assets and leverage observed
in all countries. We can also conclude that the determinants do not differ
between countries, if we except size. It then seems no divide between both
groups of countries according to economic or financial development. This
tends to suggest the existence of characteristics specific to all transition
countries that influence the determinants of leverage.
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What Determines Leverage in Transition
Countries?
Laurent WEILL – Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg, France (laurent.weill@urs.u-strasbg.fr)
This note investigates the determinants of leverage usually tested in Western
countries on a large sample of manufacturing companies from six transition econo-
mies in Central and Eastern Europe in 1998. We observe at that time the signifi-
cance of tested factors in most countries, with some differences in comparison to
Western countries. The few differences between transition countries suggest the exi-
stence of specific characteristics in determinants of leverage for these economies.
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